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JUDGMENTS DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF NoNLIABILITY UNDER INSURANCE Poucy Plaintiff insurance

company sought a declaratory judgment that the person to whom its insured had

RECENT DECISIONS

transferred his automobile was not protected by the policy for damages caused to
others, such transfer without the consent of the plaintiff being contrary to the
terms of the policy. Held, that since by statute the insurer was made directly
liable to the injured party, plaintiff was not entitled to a declaration of noncoverage, since it could not isolate one defense and try it in advance, leaving
undecided issues involving the negligence of the person to whom the automobile
was transferred. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Simpson, (Wis. 194 I) 300

N. W. 367.
One of the primary objects of the declaratory judgments acts is to provide a
remedy where none had existed previously under conventional forms of legal
procedure.1 For declaratory relief to be given, there still must be a real and
actual controversy,2 but it need not have reached the stage where some sort of
coercive relief can be granted. It is immaterial that frequently the positions of
the parties in the conventional lawsuit are reversed in the declaratory judgment
proceeding.3 Insurance companies, in particular, have been quick to take advantage of the declaratory judgment as a means of disavowing liability from
particular claims asserted against them without being obliged, as under the conventional procedure, to await the commencement of an action by the claimant. 4
Under the ordinary indemnity or liability policy, where the question of coverage
under the policy is in doubt, it becomes of great importance to the insurer to
determine such issue at the earliest possible moment. By defending the insured
in a negligence action brought against him by the injured party, the insurer
incurs considerable expense, and since it is not a party to the action, it cannot
raise its defense of noncoverage under the policy. In addition, when the insurer
does defend such action without obtaining an agreement from the insured that
its claims of nonliability under the policy shall not be waived by its defense of the
action against the insured, it is uniformly agreed that the defense of noncoverage
is waived and may not be raised in any subsequent proceeding against the insurer. 5 Also, it is by no means settled that a non-waiver agreement with the
insured, even if obtainable, is effective to prevent a waiver. 6 By standing on its
conviction of immunity and refusing to defend the action against the insured, the
insurer loses its opportunity to contest the liability of the insured and must let
the action be defended, perhaps improperly or even collusively, by the insured.
Further, the insurer might subject itself to liability under the terms of the policy
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Savoy Grill, 5 l Ohio App. 504 at
507, 1 N. E. (2d) 946 (1936).
2 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227 at 240-241, 57 S. Ct. 461
(1937).
8 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270 at 273, 61 S.
Ct. 510 (1941).
4 BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JuoGMENTS, 2d ed., 647 (1941).
5 Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Beverforden, (C. C. A. 8th, 1937) 93 F.
(2d) 166; American Mutual Liability Co. v. Agricola Furnace Co., 236 Ala. 535, 183
So. 677 (1938); Peterson v. Maloney, 181 Minn. 437, 232 N. W. 790 (1930);
Gibbs v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 87 N. H. 19, 173 A. 372 (1934).
6 In Montgomery v. Utilities Ins. Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) l 17 S. W. (2d)
486, a nonwaiver agreement was declared void as a contract to practice law.
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for refusal to defend the insured. 7 Under such circumstances, to help the insurer
out of a most perplexing difficulty, most courts allow the insurer to obtain a
declaration on the issue of coverage under the policy.8 In Wisconsin, where the
principal case was decided, the insurer is made directly liable to the injured party
by statute 9 and may be joined with the insured as a defendant 10 or may be made
the sole defendant.11 Therefore the insurer's liability under the policy and the
insured's liability for negligence are not separate issues, as is generally true.12
As a consequence, it does not become important to try the issue of coverage
separately in advance, inasmuch as the insurer can plead such fact not only as a
defense, but as a separate and distinct plea in bar in the negligence action.18 On
the other hand, disadvantage to the insurer does arise from the fact that, where
an action is not already pending against it,14 the delay of the other party in
bringing suit might entail the loss of evidence, the setting up of reserves and
other expense and inconveniences.15 Conceivably because of this fact the Wisconsin court might have granted declaratory relief in the principal case. By so
doing it would have permitted no more than is authorized by courts which allow
actions for a declaration of noncoverage in jurisdictions where liability under the
policy and liability for negligence are entirely separate issues. The result reached
by the Wisconsin court, however, appears to be in accord with the policy of the
act, which declares that the court may refuse to grant a declaratory judgment
"where such judgment or decree • • • would not terminate the uncertainty or
controversy giving rise to the proceeding." 16 The court in effect holds that
where multiple issues may be tried in one action they should not be separated so
that only part of them would be adjudicated in a declaratory judgment proceeding.
Ar~hur M. Hoffeins

7

London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Shafer, (D. C. Ohio, 1940) 35 F. Supp.

647.
8 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Young, (D. C. N. J. 1937) 18 F. Supp. 450; Maryland
Casualty Co. v. United Corp. of Massachusetts, (C. C. A. Ist, 1940) III F. (2d) 443;
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Smith, (D. C. Iowa, 1941) 41 F. Supp. 692;
Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Wachsmith, 2 Wash. (2d) 679, 99 P. (2d) 420
(1940); Merchants Mutual Casualty Co. v. Kennett, 90 N. H. 253, 7 A. (2d) 249
(1939).
9 Wis. Stat. (1941), § 85.93.
10 Wis. Stat. (1941), § 260.II.
11 Elliott v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 201 Wis. 445, 230 N. W.
87 (1930).
12 Borchard, "Declaratory Judgments and Insurance Litigation," 34 ILL. L. REv.
•
245 at 258 (1939).
18 Principal case, 300 N. W. 367 at 369.
14 No action was pending against plaintiff in the principal case.
15 BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, 2d ed., 652 (1941).
16 Wis. Stat. (1941), § 269.56 (6).

